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Abstract
This paper investigates the impacts of progressive trade openness,
technological externalities, and heterogeneity of individuals on the for-
mation of entrepreneurship in a two-country occupation choice model.
We show that trade opening gives rise to a non-monotonic process of in-
ternational specialization, in which the share of entrepreneurial firms in
the large (small) country first increases (decreases) and then decreases
(increases), with the global economy exhibiting first de-industrialization
and then re-industrialization. When countries have the same size, we
also show that strong technological externalities make the symmetric
equilibrium unstable, generating equilibrium multiplicity, while suffi-
cient heterogeneity of individuals leads to the stability and uniqueness
of the symmetric equilibrium.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, trade liberalization, externality, het-
erogeneity, stability
JEL Classification: F12, F16, J24, O14, R12
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1 Introduction
One of the most striking and solid facts stressed by the economic and busi-
ness literature on entrepreneurship is the existence of a U-shaped relation-
ship between the rate of new enterprises in the manufacturing and service
sectors and the level of economic development among developed countries.
More precisely, there has been a steadily decline in entrepreneurship from
1900 to 1970 with fewer and larger firms. Since then, a reversal of this pat-
tern has emerged with the birth of many small businesses (see Wennekers
et al., 2009 and the many references therein). The period 1900-1960 has
experienced several ups and downs in trade liberalization, so that one can
hardly think of it as being one that went through a deep economic inte-
gration process (World Bank, 1991; World Trade Organization, 2001). By
contrast, the period starting after 1960 has seen a growing number of devel-
oped countries dismantling their trade barriers (e.g., the EU, NAFTA). It
seems natural, therefore, to investigate the possible links between the rate
of new enterprises and the degree of integration.
The aim of this paper is to provide a rationale for this relationship that
otherwise remain largely unexplained. To be precise, we study how progres-
sive trade liberalization affects countries’ industrial structure through both
the channel of entrepreneurship and the process of creation/destruction of
firms. By lowering trade costs, a deeper economic integration fosters more
competition from abroad, which tends to lower prices and profits. This in
turn reduces the incentives for individuals to start a new business. However,
lower trade costs make the market size bigger by facilitating exports, which
may compensate entrepreneurs for their lower markups. The outcome of this
trade-off is, therefore, a priori undetermined. Furthermore, as the incentives
individuals face also change with country size, it seems natural to expect the
impact of trade liberalization on entrepreneurship to vary across countries.
To investigate that trade-off in a more detailed way, we also account for
1
the fact that entrepreneurs and managers are not born with the same skills
and/or do not receive the same training (Lucas, 1978), which leads us to
view firms as having heterogeneous entry costs.
In what follows, we develop a setting that combines (i) a two-country
trade setting in which the manufacturing sector operates under monopolistic
competition and increasing returns, and (ii) an occupational choice approach
in which heterogeneous individuals are entitled to be either a worker in an
existing firm or an entrepreneur producing a new variety. The monopo-
listic competition setting appears to be especially well suited to analyze
the creation of small businesses that have a limited market power, while
product differentiation allows us to capture the fundamental idea that en-
trepreneurs are often market-makers. Furthermore, assuming heterogeneous
individuals means that they have both idiosyncratic ideas and subjective at-
titudes toward entrepreneurship, two features stressed in the literature on
entrepreneurship (Casson, 2005).
Our main results all reveal that trade liberalization has contrasted effects
on countries through the creation and destruction of local firms. First of
all, we find that the large country always retains a more than proportional
share of firms, meaning that the home market effect holds (Krugman, 1980).
This does not mean, however, that this country always benefits from lower
trade costs. Indeed, trade liberalization does not translate into a simple
and monotonic process of international specialization. Specifically, we will
see that the whole process of economic integration is to be split into two
contrasting phases. In the first one, which occurs when trade costs remain
relatively high, the industrial basis of the large country grows whereas that
of the small country shrinks. Because consumers living in the small country
have access to a much wider range of varieties, the local firms lose a sub-
stantial market share in their home market, thus reducing the incentives for
people to become entrepreneurs. On the contrary, the large country firms
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benefit from a market expansion effect that leads more people to become en-
trepreneurs. Consequently, during the first phase of the integration process,
countries become more dissimilar and inequality rises.
In the second phase, which is reached when trade costs are low enough,
we observe a complete reversal in the foregoing tendencies. On the one hand,
trade costs are now sufficiently low for the small country firms to benefit
from a much larger market, thus inducing more individuals to become en-
trepreneurs. On the other hand, because foreign competition is exacerbated
by lower trade costs, business is less profitable in the large country. Hence,
during the second phase, economic integration fosters convergence between
countries. Combining the foregoing results will then allow us to show, under
a mild regularity condition, that the number of firms in the global economy
decreases during our first phase, but grows during the second one. To the
extent that the degree of development is highly correlated to the level of
integration in developed economies, this nonmonotonic process provides a
rationale for the U-shaped curve mentioned earlier. In addition, it is well
documented that the rate of new firm formation significantly varies across
countries (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004). We illustrate this fact by showing
how the creation and destruction of firms vary in countries having different
sizes.
This is not the end of the story, however. The empirical literature high-
lights another major fact, namely entrepreneurship cannot be explained
solely by individual characteristics of people, as assumed in the occupational
choice model (Jovanovic, 1982; Holmes and Schmitz, 1990). It must also ac-
count for the social and institutional environment in which they operate
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Specifically, business analysts argue that
individuals are influenced by what others do, especially when facing fuzzy
market conditions. Such influences, which are reminiscent of bandwagon
effects, may be subsumed in a network externality (Minniti, 2005). In the
3
same vein, we know from economic geography that the clustering of a grow-
ing number of firms gives rise to agglomeration economies, which lower the
production costs of firms located in the cluster and, therefore, facilitate the
creation of new firms, especially small entrants (Glaeser and Kerr, 2008).
Such economies stem from a wider array of intermediate suppliers and a
larger labor pool available to firms, as well as from information spillovers
that develop within the cluster (Duranton and Puga, 2004). Both agglom-
eration and network economies generate external increasing returns with
respect to the cluster size and may, therefore, be captured in the same way.
More precisely, these two strands of literature are reconciled in our frame-
work by assuming that potential entrepreneurs are positively affected by
an externality whose intensity rises with the number of local entrepreneurs.
Though somewhat ad hoc, such a modeling strategy is consistent with var-
ious underlying microeconomic mechanisms. It is worth stressing that it
entails no loss of generality as long as we confine ourselves to a positive
analysis.
In order to uncover the pure impact of agglomeration externalities on
the nature of trade while keeping the analysis tractable, we consider the
case in which countries are identical. In such a case, there always exists a
symmetric equilibrium where their industrial structures are identical; when
the externality is weak, it is unique and globally stable. However, when the
externality is sufficiently strong, the symmetric pattern ceases to be a stable
equilibrium. Instead there are multiple asymmetric equilibria that are now
stable, a feature that does not depend on the assumption of symmetric coun-
tries. To put it differently, once it is recognized that the entrepreneurship
process is subject to a sufficient amount of agglomeration/network external-
ities, it appears that trade liberalization favors the emergence of inequalities
between countries that are otherwise identical. Such a result points to the
exacerbation of the tendencies toward inequality but the multiplicity of sta-
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ble equilibria makes it hard to predict which country will benefit from the
externalities.
However, we would like to emphasize that the heterogeneity of individu-
als acts as a force which tends to smooth out the destabilizing effects of the
agglomeration externality. By increasing the degree of heterogeneity within
the population according to specifications that will be explained below, we
are able to establish the following two results. First, we show that a sufficient
amount of “local” heterogeneity in the vicinity of the symmetric equilibrium
overcomes the impact of the agglomeration externality and restores the local
stability of this equilibrium. Second, allowing for a large amount of “global”
heterogeneity suffices to guarantee the uniqueness, hence the global stabil-
ity, of the symmetric equilibrium. Because there is ample evidence that
individuals have very contrasted attitudes toward entrepreneurship, these
two results suggest that the emphasis put on the network externality in
the business literature may not be warranted. They also shed light on the
macroscopic consequences of microeconomic attitudes: more heterogeneity
at the individual level would be accompanied by less disparity at the global
level. Conversely, more homogeneous individuals could strengthen the im-
pact of the network externality, thereby exacerbating international inequal-
ities. Thus, as shown by Herrendorf et al. (2000) in a different context,
heterogeneity has a stabilizing effect. Finally, we compare these two results
to those derived in other models where the idea of heterogeneity has been
applied. As will be seen, the similarity between results obtained in set-
tings that otherwise vastly differ suggests that there is probably a general
principle at work.
Another aspect of firm heterogeneity has been recently explored by
Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
among others. They aim to explain the well-documented fact that the most
productive firms export while less efficient firms focus on their local mar-
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kets only, the least efficient ones exiting the market. Once it is recognized
that firms differ in marginal production costs, these authors show that mar-
ket integration exacerbates this discrepancy in export strategies because
lower trade costs intensify product market competition and trigger a selec-
tion effect of firms located in each country. In our paper, firms know their
types before entry and are heterogeneous in their average production costs,
whereas Melitz and others assume that firms know their types after entry
and observe that they are heterogeneous in their marginal production costs.
What drives firm heterogeneity is ultimately an empirical question. What-
ever the answer, when firms are ex ante heterogeneous in marginal costs
instead of entry costs, the main results of our analysis remain valid. The
main difference between the two approaches is that inefficient firms do not
enter the market in ours because they know ex ante their types. In Melitz
(2003), firms are ex ante homogeneous and observe during the interim that
they have different marginal costs. The inefficient firms then exit the market
whereas here they refrain from entering. Note that, in the two approaches,
the ex post productivity distributions are observationally equivalent.
Our paper also bears some resemblance with new economic geography
(Fujita and Thisse, 2009). Krugman (1980) deals with the mobility of homo-
geneous firms in a setting which involves asymmetric countries, monopolistic
competition and increasing returns. He shows that the large country accom-
modates a more than proportional share of firms, while lowering trade costs
exacerbates the agglomeration of firms in the large country. However, our
paper differs from Krugman (1980) in three fundamental aspects. First,
we assume that capital is geographically immobile. Second, the number of
firms is determined through the creation and destruction of firms involving
heterogeneous entry costs. Third, there is no magnification of the home
market effect where as integration proceeds, the relative share of the manu-
facturing sector in the large country keeps rising. The U-shaped relationship
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between industrialization and trade costs we uncover is reminiscent of the
main outcome obtained by Krugman and Venables (1995), but it arises for
very different reasons since firms are geographically immobile in our setting.
Amiti and Pissarides (2005) allow for heterogeneous workers and study the
relationship between skill mismatch and firm agglomeration. They show
that decreasing trade costs induce the monotonic agglomeration of firms.
We also differ from Nocke (2006) where individuals decide whether or not
to become entrepreneurs in the country in which they choose to live. As a
conclusion, we find it fair to say that new economic geography has gone into
full circle in that our paper captures several features of this field without
assuming factor mobility between countries.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. The model and some
preliminary results are presented in Section 2. Section 3 studies the impact
of trade liberalization on countries’ industrial structure. The role of network
externalities and the stabilizing effect of individuals’ heterogeneity are dealt
with in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model and intermediate results
2.1 The economy
The economy involves two goods and two countries i = 1, 2 with a population
of size m1 and m2, respectively; without loss of generality, we assume that
m1 ≥ m2. Individuals are entitled to be either a worker in an existing
firm or an entrepreneur launching a firm that produces a new variety. Our
focus being on the heterogeneity of firms in terms of entry costs, we choose
to model this idea by assuming that potential entrepreneurs have different
opportunity costs, thus implying that they incur different costs when they
choose to enter the market as an entrepreneur. Formally, we assume that an
individual of type α is endowed with α efficiency units of labor and 1 unit
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of entrepreneurship. Types of individuals living in country i are distributed
according to the distribution function Fi : [αi, αi]→ [0,mi] with 0 ≤ αi < αi,
which has a differentiable density function fi such that fi(α) > 0 for all
α ∈ [αi, αi].
Individuals are internationally immobile and have the same quasi-linear
log-utility with respect to a continuum N of varieties of a (horizontally)
differentiated good (M) and a homogeneous good (A):
U = µ lnM +A µ > 0 (2.1)
where the subutility over the varieties is of the CES-type:
M =
[∫ N
0
q(x)
σ−1
σ dx
] σ
σ−1
with σ > 1 being the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties.1
Although quasi-linear preferences rank far behind homothetic preferences
in general equilibrium models of trade, Dinopoulos et al. (2007) show that
“quasi-linear preferences behave reasonably well in general-equilibrium set-
tings” . Note, however, that our results remain valid when the upper-tier
utility is of the Cobb-Douglas type.2 We have chosen to work with a quasi-
linear specification because it allows for a simple and neat presentation of
our results. All individuals are endowed with A > 0 units of the homoge-
neous good. The initial endowment A is supposed to be larger than µ for
the consumption of this good to be strictly positive at the market outcome.
Consequently, our setting involves no income effect.
The differentiated good M is produced by the manufacturing sector un-
der increasing returns and monopolistic competition, using both entrepreneurs
and workers. More precisely, producing q units of a variety requires 1 unit
of entrepreneurship and cq units of labor (without loss of generality, we set
1Such preferences are also used by Martin and Rogers (1995) and Pflu¨ger (2004) in
trade and geography models.
2Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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c = 1 by choosing the unit of good M). Hence, firms are heterogeneous in
terms of entry cost. Indeed, an individual of type α incurs an opportunity
cost equal to α when she chooses to operate in the manufacturing sector,
so that different firms have different entry costs.3 Note that the total mass
N = n1+n2 of firms is endogenous since the mass of country-i entrepreneurs
ni is endogenous. Finally, shipping one unit of a differentiated good requires
τ ≥ 1 units of this good (the iceberg trade cost); in particular, zero trade
cost means τ = 1, whereas countries are autarkic when τ →∞.
The homogeneous good A is supplied under perfect competition using
labor as the only input of a constant-returns technology. The unit input
requirement is set to one by choice of units.
Recall that our primary purpose is to investigate how progressive de-
crease in trade costs for the industrial good affects the sectoral structure
of each country. In order to isolate this effect, we choose to work with a
setting in which workers’ wage is equalized between the two countries. This
is guaranteed by the assumption of zero trade cost for the homogeneous
good, which also enables us to capture the intuitive idea that the homoge-
neous good is standardized and easy to ship in bulk, whereas the industrial
good is more sophisticated and, therefore, costly to trade.4 This makes the
homogeneous good the natural choice for the nume´raire. Consequently, in
equilibrium, market wages are the same in both countries and equal to 1.
This in turn implies that an α-type worker has an income equal to α. In
an entrepreneurship equilibrium to be defined below, an individual of type
α in country i becomes an entrepreneur if and only if she earns an salary
wi higher than α. This has two major implications. First, the entry pro-
3In an alternative interpretation, the entry decision is associated with an effort made
by individuals. In this context, individuals are heterogenous in the effort cost α borne to
become entrepreneurs (a similar approach is followed by Jovanovic (1994) in a different
context).
4See, e.g., Krugman (1991) and Helpman et al. (2004) for a similar assumption.
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cess displays decreasing returns since the relative cost of firm creation goes
up since more and more efficient workers are drawn away from production.
Second, workers’ average income rises when the mass of firms operating in
the manufacturing sector increases. In other words, our model captures the
fact that a rising number of entrepreneurs leads to a higher average income
across workers (Lucas, 1978).
2.2 The market equilibrium
Fixing the number of entrepreneurs n1 and n2 in each country, we now deter-
mine the market equilibrium and the corresponding entrepreneurs’ salaries
as functions of n1 and n2. Let pij denote the mill price charged by a firm
located in country i = 1, 2 to its customers living in country j = 1, 2. The
individual demands in countries i and j 6= i for variety x ∈ [0, N ] produced
in country i are respectively given by
qii =
µP σ−1i
pσii
qij =
µP σ−1j
(τpij)
σ
where Pi is the price index of the differentiated good in country i. Since all
firms located in country i charge the same mill price in country j, the price
index in country i is given by
Pi =
[
Nip
−(σ−1)
ii +Nj(τpji)
−(σ−1)
] −1
σ−1
.
Note that (2.1) implies that a country-i individual consumes µ/Pi units of
the manufactured goods, thus implying that her expenditure on this good is
equal to µ. Therefore, country-i’s expenditure on good M is constant and
equal to µmi.
The profit of a country-i firm is as follows:
pii = (pii − 1)qiimi + (pij − 1)τqijmj − wi
thus implying that its equilibrium mill prices are given by
p∗ii = p
∗
ij =
σ
σ − 1 .
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Let φ := τ1−σ ∈ [0, 1] be the degree of trade openness: a larger value of φ
means lower trade costs, with φ = 0 when τ → ∞ and φ = 1 when τ = 1.
Then, the equilibrium price index is expressed as
Pi =
σ
σ − 1 (ni + φnj)
− 1
σ−1 . (2.2)
Under free entry and exit, whence zero profits, the equilibrium en-
trepreneur income in country i is given by a firm’s operating profits:
wi(ni, nj) =
1
σ
(
µmi
ni + φnj
+ φ
µmj
nj + φni
)
. (2.3)
Thus, the equilibrium income prevailing in country i decreases with the
number of entrepreneurs in this country. It also decreases with the number
of entrepreneurs in country j because trade makes the two national labor
markets interdependent through the mass of varieties they trade. Last,
since operating profits are higher, a stronger preference for the industrial
good (i.e., larger µ) and/or more differentiated varieties (i.e., lower σ) leads
to higher equilibrium salaries. Note that, in equilibrium, an entrepreneur’s
salary wi exceeds her opportunity cost α.
The expression (2.3) may be given a very intuitive interpretation. The
first bracketed term is the revenue gleaned by a country-i firm in its do-
mestic market, whereas the second stands for the revenue gleaned in the
foreign market, which is “discounted” by φ ∈ [0, 1] on account of the re-
sources needed to sell abroad. All firms compete for the total expenditure
on the manufactured good spent by country-i’s residents, which is equal to
µmi. This “pie” is equally divided among country-i firms, but not between
country-i firms and country-j firms because of the existence of trade costs
(0 < φ < 1). Furthermore, the pie accruing to a country-i firm is distributed
between the entrepreneur and the workers according to the shares (p∗−1)/p∗
and 1/p∗, respectively, where p∗ = σ/(σ − 1) is the equilibrium mill price.
This implies that an entrepreneur receives a fraction 1/σ of the pie. Then,
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for any given n1 and n2, the following equality must hold at the market
equilibrium: ∑
i=1,2
wi(n1, n2)ni =
µ
σ
(m1 +m2). (2.4)
2.3 The entrepreneurship equilibrium
We now describe the equilibrium occupational choices. An α-type individual
living in country i earns α as a worker and chooses to become an entrepreneur
if and only if her worker income is less than the earnings she makes as an
entrepreneur:
α ≤ wi(ni, nj)
so that the mass of entrepreneurs in this country is given by Fi[wi(ni, nj)].5
A pair (n∗1, n∗2) is an entrepreneurship equilibrium if and only if
n∗1 = F1[w1(n
∗
1, n
∗
2)] n
∗
2 = F2[w2(n
∗
1, n
∗
2)]. (2.5)
Observe that ∂Fi[wi(ni, nj)]/∂nj < 0, so that entrepreneurship decisions are
strategic substitutes between countries. This property relies on the fact that
firms compete across countries and does not depend on the specific features
of our model.
Since wi(n∗1, n∗2) = F
−1
i (n
∗
i ) holds whenever (n
∗
1, n
∗
2) is an entrepreneur-
ship equilibrium for some φ, by equation (2.4) the equilibrium must always
lie on the locus of
E(n1, n2) := F−11 (n1)n1 + F
−1
2 (n2)n2 −
µ
σ
(m1 +m2) = 0 (2.6)
regardless of the value of φ. Observe that this locus is downward sloping
in the n1-n2 plane because of strategic substitutability of entrepreneurship
decisions between countries.
Observation 2.1. The locus of E(n1, n2) = 0 is downward sloping.
5An individual being negligible, her occupational choice has no impact on the mass of
available varieties. Thus, maximizing income amounts here to maximizing utility.
12
In other words, if the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs in country i,
n∗i , increases, then n
∗
j must decrease in j.
It remains to find conditions for an entrepreneurship equilibrium to ex-
ist. First, note that (2.3) implies that wi has a minimizer wmini > 0 inde-
pendent of σ. The continuous function wi also has a maximizer wmaxi in
the compact set [F (wmin1 ),m1] × [F (wmin2 ),m2]. Assume that the interval
(αi, αi) is wide enough to include [wmini , w
max
i ], which implies that there
are always some individuals with sufficiently low α who choose to become
entrepreneurs and some with sufficiently high α who choose to become work-
ers, whatever the others’ choice. Under these conditions, we may restrict the
domain of Fi ◦ wi over the compact and convex set [F1(wmin1 ), F1(wmax1 )] ×
[F2(wmin2 ), F2(w
max
2 )]. Furthermore, the continuous function Fi ◦ wi takes
its value in [Fi(wmini ), Fi(w
max
i )] because Fi is increasing. Hence, Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem implies that the mapping (F1 ◦ w1, F2 ◦ w2) has a fixed
point in the restricted domain of (n1, n2), and this point is an entrepreneur-
ship equilibrium. We will assume throughout the rest of the paper that
[wmini , w
max
i ] ⊂ (αi, αi) for i = 1, 2.
In the next section, we study how the shares of entrepreneurs-firms in
both countries, whence the size and the international distribution of the
manufacturing sector, react to gradual trade opening.
3 The impact of trade opening
In order to focus on the interactions between country size and trade open-
ness, we consider the case in which the type distributions in the two coun-
tries are identical up to a scale parameter that reflects the country size, i.e.,
[αi, αi] = [α, α], and Fi(α) = miG(α) for a common distribution function
G : [α, α] → [0, 1]. We assume that G has a differentiable density g and
g(α) > 0 for all α ∈ [α, α]. Accordingly, we focus on si := ni/mi, the
fraction of entrepreneurs in each country i. So, from now on, we refer to
13
(s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) as being the entrepreneurship equilibrium.
3.1 National industrialization
It follows directly from (2.5) that (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) is an entrepreneurship equi-
librium if and only if s∗1(φ) and s∗2(φ) satisfy the following two conditions:
D¯1(s1, s2;φ) := G(w¯1(s1, s2;φ))− s1 = 0
D¯2(s1, s2;φ) := G(w¯2(s1, s2;φ))− s2 = 0
where w¯i : [0, 1]2 × [0, 1] → R is the salary of an entrepreneur in country i,
which is defined by
w¯i(s1, s2;φ) =
1
σ
(
µmi
misi + φmjsj
+
φµmj
mjsj + φmisi
)
. (3.1)
It is readily verified that, for any (s1, s2), ∂D¯i/∂sj < 0 for i, j = 1, 2.
Furthermore, we have ∣∣∣∣∂D¯1∂s1
/
∂D¯1
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂D¯2∂s1
/
∂D¯2
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ .
To show it, observe that∣∣∣∣∂D¯1∂s1
/
∂D¯1
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∂G(w¯1)∂s1
/
∂G(w¯1)
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂w¯1∂s1
/
∂w¯1
∂s2
∣∣∣∣
while ∣∣∣∣∂D¯2∂s1
/
∂D¯2
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣∂G(w¯2)∂s1
/
∂G(w¯2)
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∂w¯2∂s1
/
∂w¯2
∂s2
∣∣∣∣ .
The desired result then follows from∣∣∣∣∂w¯1∂s1 · ∂w¯2∂s2
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∣∂w¯1∂s2 · ∂w¯2∂s1
∣∣∣∣
which always holds.
Observation 3.1. In the s1-s2 plane,
1. the locus of D¯i(s1, s2) = 0 is downward sloping;
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2. D¯i(t1, t2) > 0 if (t1, t2) belongs to the south-west domain delineated by
D¯i(s1, s2) = 0, while D¯i(t1, t2) < 0 if (t1, t2) belongs to the north-east
domain; and
3. at any entrepreneurship equilibrium (s∗1, s∗2), D¯1(s1, s2) = 0 is steeper
than D¯2(s1, s2) = 0.
By continuity, the third statement implies that the equilibrium (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ))
is unique for any φ.
When each country is in autarky (φ = 0) or when the two countries
are fully integrated (φ = 1), the entrepreneurs’ salary is independent of the
country size because
w¯i(s, s; 0) = w¯i(s, s; 1) =
µ
σs
for any s and m1,m2. Since
D¯i(s, s; 0) = D¯i(s, s; 1) = G
( µ
σs
)
− s
holds regardless of the value of m1 and m2, it must be that D¯i(s¯, s¯; 0) =
D¯i(s¯, s¯; 1) = 0, where s¯ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique solution to the equation
G
( µ
σs
)
− s = 0.
Thus,
s∗1(0) = s
∗
2(0) = s
∗
1(1) = s
∗
2(1) = s¯.
In other words, size does not matter for the share of entrepreneurs in the
two polar cases in which trading is either prohibitively expensive or costless.
Note, however, that all individuals are better off in the latter than in the
former case because they have access to a wider array of varieties.
Let us now come to the more interesting case in which 0 < φ < 1. We
then have:
Observation 3.2. (i) If m1 = m2, then s∗1(φ) = s∗2(φ) = s¯ for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) If m1 > m2, then 0 < s∗2(φ) < s∗1(φ) < 1 for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. (i) If m1 = m2, then (3.1) implies that w¯i(s, s;φ) is independent
of m1 and m2. Hence, we have s∗1(φ) = s∗2(φ) = s¯ for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) If m1 > m2, then we have D¯1(s¯, s¯;φ) > 0 and D¯2(s¯, s¯;φ) < 0 for all
φ ∈ (0, 1). By Observation 3.1, this implies that (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) lies below the
bisector, i.e., s∗1(φ) > s∗2(φ) for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
Since ymin2 > α by assumption, it must be that D¯2(s1, 0;φ) > 0 for any s1
and φ. This implies that D¯2(s1, 0;φ) = 0 never intersects the s1-axis, which
in turn implies that (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) never lies on the s1-axis, i.e., s∗2(φ) > 0
for all φ ∈ (0, 1). Likewise, ymax1 < α implies s∗1(φ) < 1 for all φ ∈ (0, 1). ‖
From (2.6), observe that the equilibrium (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) always lies on the
locus of
E¯(s1, s2) := m1G−1(s1)s1 +m2G−1(s2)s2 − µ
σ
(m1 +m2) = 0. (3.2)
As in Observation 2.1, this locus is downward sloping in the s1-s2 plane.
This implies that, as φ increases from 0 to 1, s∗1(φ) and s∗2(φ) always move
in opposite directions. Specifically, the equilibrium (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) starts
from (s¯, s¯), moves continuously along the locus E¯(s1, s2), and ends up at
(s¯, s¯). We will show below that (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) changes its direction only
once. Since (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) is given by the intersection point of E¯(s1, s2) = 0
and D¯1(s1, s2;φ) = 0, it suffices to show that, as φ increases from 0 to 1,
D¯1(s1, s2;φ) = 0 changes its direction only once.
Lemma 3.3. For any given (s1, s2), the equation D¯1(s1, s2;φ) = 0 has at
most two solutions in terms of φ.
Proof. Fix any point (s1, s2). We claim that
∂D¯1
∂φ
= g(w¯1)
∂w¯1
∂φ
changes its sign at most once. Since g(·) > 0, it is sufficient to show that
∂w¯1/∂φ = 0 has at most one solution, which can be established by direct
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Figure 1: Entrepreneurship equilibrium
computation. Hence, D¯1(s1, s2;φ) changes its slope at most once, which in
turn implies that D¯1(s1, s2;φ) = 0 has at most two solutions in φ. ‖
This has the following implication.
Observation 3.4. As φ increases from 0 to 1, (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) changes its
direction only once.
Proof. Fix any point (t1, t2) on the locus of E¯(s1, s2) = 0. By continuity
of the equilibrium with respect to φ, it is sufficient to show that (t1, t2)
becomes an equilibrium for at most two distinct values of φ. Furthermore,
(t1, t2) is an equilibrium only if it satisfies D¯1(t1, t2;φ) = 0 for some φ.
Finally, Lemma 3.3 implies that there exist at most two such φ’s. ‖
To sum up, we have:
Proposition 3.5. For all φ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a unique entrepreneurship
equilibrium (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)).
(i) For any m1 and m2, s∗1(0) = s∗2(0) = s∗1(1) = s∗2(1) = s¯.
(ii) If m1 > m2, then s∗1(φ) > s∗2(φ) > 0 for all φ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
there exists a unique φˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that s¯ < s∗1(φ) < s∗1(φ′) and s¯ > s∗2(φ) >
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s∗2(φ′) when 0 < φ < φ′ ≤ φˆ, while s∗1(φ) > s∗1(φ′) > s¯ and s∗2(φ) < s∗2(φ′) < s¯
when φˆ ≤ φ < φ′ < 1.
(iii) If m1 = m2, then s∗1(φ) = s∗2(φ) = s¯ for all φ ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 1 depicts the entrepreneurship equilibrium as well as the relevant
loci. Since both countries exhibit a reversal in the evolution of their in-
dustrial structure at φˆ, we refer to the interval (0, φˆ) as describing the first
phase of the integration process, while (φˆ, 1) corresponds to the second one.
Proposition 3.5 has several important implications. First, the share of
entrepreneurs is always larger in the large country than in the small country.
This implies that the large country is relatively more specialized in the
manufacturing sector than the small country. This in turn means that the
salary of an entrepreneur is higher in the large country than in the small one.
Therefore, because P ∗1 < P ∗2 , both entrepreneurs and workers in country 1
are better off than their counterpart in country 2. Accordingly, we may
safely conclude that, once countries have different sizes, spatial frictions in
trade generate asymmetries in the international distribution of income and
welfare.
Second, the global economy displays a home market effect. Recall that
such an effect arises when the large country accommodates a more than
proportional share of firms (Krugman, 1980). The share of country 1’s
industrial firms in the global economy is such that
n∗1(φ)
n∗1(φ) + n∗2(φ)
=
m1s
∗
1(φ)
m1s∗1(φ) +m2s∗2(φ)
>
m1
m1 +m2
because s∗1(φ) > s∗2(φ) once 0 < φ < 1 and m1 > m2. In other words, the
share of firms in the large country always exceeds its relative size.
Last, trade liberalization has a dramatic impact on each country’s degree
of industrialization. Indeed, trade links the two countries in a way such that
one country always develops its industry at the expense of the other. More
precisely, during the first phase of integration the number of entrepreneurs
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increases in the large country but decreases in the small one. This means
that the large country gets more industrialized, whereas the small one ex-
periences de-industrialization. During the first phase, the per capita income
increases in the large country and decreases in the small one because both
s∗1 and w∗1 rise, whereas s∗2 and w∗2 fall. The first phase thus agrees with
the prediction made in new economic geography models in which, as trade
costs go down, the share of firms grows in the large country, but decreases
in the small one. However, there is no magnification effect as integration
proceeds since the relative share of manufacturing in the large country no
longer increases with further trade liberalization. Quite the opposite, during
the second phase, the small country gradually recoups its industrial basis
and the two industrial structures converge. At first glance, the creation of
new firms through the development of entrepreneurship might be viewed as
a substitute to the international mobility of capital and firms in the global
economy. Results are different, however. There are two reasons for that.
First, individuals choose to become entrepreneurs, instead of being endowed
with units of capital. Second, entrepreneurs invest in their own country,
while capital-owners seek the country with the highest rental rate of capital.
Thus, individuals face different incentive structures in the two settings.
The above pattern may be explained as follows. As discussed in the
introduction, trade liberalization gives rise to two conflicting effects that
shape the global economy. The former, called the market expansion effect,
finds its origin in the fact that exporting becomes easier, thus strengthen-
ing the incentives to become an entrepreneur. The latter, which we refer
to as the market crowing effect, is the mirror image of the former: as it
becomes easier for each country to import new varieties, the incentives to
become an entrepreneur are weaker. Because of strategic substitutability
of entrepreneurship decisions between countries, if one effect dominates the
other in one country, the reverse must hold in the other one. In order to
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study the behavior of these two effects as φ varies from 0 to 1, we take the
partial derivative of (3.1) with respect to φ:
∂w¯i
∂φ
(s1, s2;φ) =
1
σ
[
− µmi
misi + φmjsj
· mjsj
misi + φmjsj
+
µmj
mjsj + φmisi
− φµmj
mjsj + φmisi
· misi
mjsj + φmisi
]
.
Hence, the impact of trade opening on a country-i firm can be decomposed
in three effects: (i) the first term represents the market crowding effect
in the home country, (ii) the second is the market expansion effect in the
foreign country, and (iii) the third is the market crowding effect in the foreign
country. In these terms, φµmj is the effective size of the foreign market for a
country-i firm, whilemisi+φmjsj is the effective number of firms competing
in country i.
Clearly, when φ = 0, the third term vanishes and we obtain
∂w¯i
∂φ
(s¯, s¯; 0) =
1
σ
[
−µmi
mis¯
· mj s¯
mis¯
+
µmj
mj s¯
]
=
1
σ
µ
s¯
(
−mj
mi
+ 1
)
.
Hence, for a country-1 firm, the market crowding effect in the home market
is dominated by the market expansion effect since m1 > m2, whereas the
opposite holds for the small country. This is because the growth in the
effective number of firms is bigger in the small country than in the small
one.
When φ = 1, we have
∂w¯i
∂φ
(s¯, s¯; 1) =
1
σ
[
− µmi
mis¯+mj s¯
· mj s¯
mis¯+mj s¯
+
µmj
mj s¯+mis¯
− µmj
mj s¯+mis¯
· mis¯
mj s¯+mis¯
]
=
1
σ
· −µmi + µmj
(mi +mj)s¯
· mj
mi +mj
.
In this case, the home and foreign market crowding effects are strongest
because countries are fully integrated. Their combination dominates the
market expansion effect for a country-1 firm, whereas the opposite holds
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for a country-2 firm. Indeed, the impact of competition being perfectly
symmetric, what the large country gains is more than offset by what it
loses.
Assume now that φ ∈ (0, 1). First, recall that µmi is the total ex-
penditure of country-i’s residents on the industrial good, which is constant
regardless of the trade openness φ. Assuming that m1 > m2, a marginal
increase in the access to the foreign market is always larger for the small
country firms than for the large country firms. Second, since m1s1 > m2s2,
the effective number of competing firms in the large country, m1s1+φm2s2,
is bigger than that in the small country, φm1s1 +m2s2, but the difference
between those numbers becomes smaller as φ rises. Consequently, as in-
tegration proceeds, the market crowding effect becomes stronger relative
to the market expansion effect for the large country firms, and vice versa
for the small country firms. What Proposition 3.5 says is that, during the
first phase of integration, the market expansion effect dominates the mar-
ket crowding effect for the large country as it does when φ = 0, so that
the number of firms in the large country increases while that of the small
one decreases. Conversely, during the second phase, the market crowding
effect dominates the market expansion effect for the large country as it does
when φ = 1, so that the large country workers face weaker incentives to get
skilled, which in turn implies that some of the small country workers choose
to become entrepreneurs.6
Three final remarks are in order. First, it is worth stressing that all
the properties derived above hold for any distribution of types. Our main
assumption is the quasi-linearity of preferences, which allows us to abstract
from the income effect and to isolate the market expansion and crowding
effects which go only through the price index. Yet, the inverted U-shaped
6Note that the inverted U-shaped process is also valid with a Cobb-Douglas utility
function. Hence, it is not a consequence of the absence of an income effect.
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process remains valid with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Hence, this
result is not a consequence of the absence of an income effect. Second, as
shown in Appendix A.1, the preceding analysis holds true even when firms
are heterogeneous in terms of marginal costs instead of entry costs provided
that individuals know their types before making the entry decision. Third,
when both countries have the same size, all results boil down to a trivial
outcome in which the two countries keep the same industrial structure during
the integration process.
3.2 Global industrialization
It remains to study the trajectory of the equilibrium as a function of the
degree of openness. As φ changes, the entrepreneurial income changes, thus
inducing some individuals to modify their occupational choice. Clearly, the
mass of the individuals who switch occupation depends on the shape of the
density unction g. If this function has a complex form, then so may be
the equilibrium trajectory. The following assumption imposes a standard
regularity condition on the density g that allows us to obtain a simple and
neat characterization of the equilibrium trajectory.
Assumption 3.1. The density function g is ρ-concave for some ρ > −1/2.
Such an assumption is far from being new in the economics literature.7
It has been introduced by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991a, 1991b) and used ex-
tensively in differentiated oligopoly models (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 1992).
Note that ρ-concavity with ρ < 0 is a weaker requirement than log-concavity
(0-concavity is equivalent to log-concavity). Hence, our assumption covers
the class of log-concave densities, which include many probability distri-
butions such as the Pareto, beta, Dirichlet, exponential, gamma, Laplace,
7Recall that a function f is ρ-concave if fρ is concave.
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normal, and Gumbel distributions.8 Thus, we find it fair to say that our
ρ-concavity assumption imposes a relatively mild restriction on the density
function g.
Under this regularity condition, we can show the following.
Lemma 3.6. Under Assumption 3.1, the locus of E¯(s1, s2) = 0 is strictly
concave.
Proof. Because g is −1/2-concave, the Pre´kopa-Borell theorem implies
that G is ρ′-concave for some ρ′ > −1. This in turn implies that 1/G is
strictly convex (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991b). Given (2.6), it then suffices
to show that d(G−1(x)x)/dx = (G−1)′(x)x + G−1(x) is increasing in x for
the statement to hold. Since (G−1)′(x) = 1/G′(G−1(x)) and since G−1 is
increasing, this is amount to saying that
G(α)
G′(α)
+ α
is increasing in α. Taking the derivative of this expression, it is readily
verified that this holds if and only if
2(G′(α))2 −G(α)G′′(α) > 0
for all α, which means that 1/G is strictly convex. ‖
The slope of the locus of E(s1, s2) = 0 is −m1/m2 at (s¯, s¯). Provided
m1 > m2, Lemma 3.6 and Observation 2.1 imply that∣∣∣∣dn∗1(φ)dφ
∣∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣∣dn∗2(φ)dφ
∣∣∣∣
for all φ 6= 0, 1, φˆ. Therefore, the size of the manufacturing sector in the
small country is more sensitive to variations in trade obstacles than in the
large one.
8As shown by Pre´kopa (1971), log-concavity may require restrictions on the parameter
values for some of these distributions.
23
Denote by N∗(φ) the total number of firms in the whole economy:
N∗(φ) = m1s∗1(φ) +m2s
∗
2(φ).
Since n∗2 decreases (respectively, increases) faster than n∗1 (respectively, de-
creases) over the interval (0, φˆ) (resp., (φˆ, 1)), we have:
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that m1 6= m2. Under Assumption 3.1, N∗(φ)
decreases over (0, φˆ) but increases over (φˆ, 1).
In other words, as trade barriers are gradually removed, the global econ-
omy experiences the destruction of firms and the shrinking of variety, but
faces the creation of firms and the widening of variety when international
integration gets sufficiently deep. By making the whole array of varieties
available in the global economy accessible to all consumers, the first integra-
tion phase induces less individuals to become entrepreneurs. On the other
hand, during the second phase, the global market is sufficiently integrated
to make the incentives to get entrepreneurs stronger and to bring the level
of industrialization back to its initial level.
At this stage, it is worth stressing the analogy between the foregoing
proposition and the bell-shaped curve of spatial development obtained in
economic geography (Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004). In the former, there is no
labor mobility between countries, but occupational choice makes endogenous
the industrial structure of each country. In the latter, there is no sectoral
mobility of labor, but the migration of workers between countries permits
the emergence of economic agglomerations. The analogy lies in the fact
that, during the first phase of integration, the two countries become more
dissimilar, while their industrial structure converges during the second one.
4 The impact of externality and heterogeneity
As discussed in the introduction, the birth of firms often flourishes in coun-
tries in which agglomeration and network externalities increase the produc-
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tivity of newly created firms. In such a context, firms enjoy external increas-
ing returns. Note that this effect depends only upon the number of firms,
not on their individual characteristics as in the section above. Furthermore,
these externalities are confined to each country in order to capture the well-
documented fact that the scope of agglomeration externalities and spillovers
is limited in space (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange,
2004). To achieve our goal, we use a general reduced-form expression hi
to study the impact of these externalities on the market outcome so that
there is no need to describe the various processes that stand behind them.
Specifically, we assume that producing q units of a variety in country i now
requires 1/hi(ni) ≤ 1 units of entrepreneurship and q units of labor. In other
words, increasing the number of local firms amounts to reducing the fixed
requirement of entrepreneurial units. Or, put differently, externalities allow
an entrepreneur to run a number hi(ni) ≥ 1 of firms producing each a single
variety. We assume that hi is continuously differentiable and increasing in
ni ∈ [0,mi]. In equilibrium, the total mass of varieties produced in country
i is therefore equal to
Ni = nihi(ni)
so that N = n1h1(n1) + n2h2(n2). In an entrepreneurship equilibrium, an
individual of type α becomes an entrepreneur if and only if she makes an
income yi = hi(ni)wi higher than α, where wi is the income earned from
running a single firm. The equilibrium income yi of an entrepreneur living
in country i is now given by (see (2.3)):
yi(ni, nj) =
1
σ
[
µmihi(ni)
nihi(ni) + φnjhj(nj)
+ φ
µmjhi(ni)
njhj(nj) + φnihi(ni)
]
. (4.1)
Accordingly, an entrepreneurship equilibrium is defined to be a pair (n∗1, n∗2)
such that
n∗1 = F1[y1(n
∗
1, n
∗
2)] n
∗
2 = F2[y2(n
∗
1, n
∗
2)].
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It is readily verified that (2.4) holds true when wi is replaced by yi, and
thus all entrepreneurship equilibria lie on the locus of E(n1, n2) = 0 as de-
fined in (2.6). As long as the externality is sufficiently weak for a unique
entrepreneurship equilibrium to exist, this one behaves as does the equilib-
rium described in Section 3. However, when the externality becomes strong
enough, there are multiple equilibria, which may behave very differently
(Cooper and John, 1988; Matsuyama, 1991).
Our purpose being to study the stabilizing effect of individual hetero-
geneity, in order to keep the analysis simple we assume that the two coun-
tries are identical. In other words, countries now have the same size, i.e.,
m1 = m2, which is normalized to 1 so that ni = si, the same density of
types, i.e., F1 = F2 = F (with a density f and a common support [α, α]),
and the same externality function, i.e., h1 = h2 = h with h(·) > 0 and
h′(·) ≥ 0. In such a context, there is always a symmetric entrepreneurship
equilibrium. Yet, in the presence of externalities, equilibria involving very
different industrial structures typically exist as well. We first show that the
same holds in our setting once externalities are sufficiently strong.
We then revisit these issues by emphasizing the stabilizing effect of the
heterogeneity of individuals. To this end, we distinguish between local and
global heterogeneity. More precisely, we demonstrate that sufficient local
heterogeneity makes the symmetric entrepreneurship equilibrium locally sta-
ble, while a sufficient amount of global heterogeneity leads to the uniqueness,
hence the global stability, of this equilibrium. Having shown that, even with
asymmetric countries, we find it reasonable to expect that sufficient global
heterogeneity generates a unique entrepreneurship equilibrium, the behavior
of which is similar to the one described in Section 3.
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4.1 Externality and multiplicity
As a preliminary step, we identify a sufficient condition under which our
setting displays multiple equilibria. Recall that all equilibria are given by
the intersection points of the following two loci:
D1(n1, n2) = F [y1(n1, n2)]− n1 = 0
D2(n1, n2) = F [y2(n1, n2)]− n2 = 0.
(4.2)
Let n¯ ∈ [0, 1] be the unique solution to
F
( µ
σn
)
= n. (4.3)
Observe that the symmetric state (n¯, n¯) is always an equilibrium irre-
spective of h(·) and φ. Let
y¯ = yi(n¯, n¯) =
µ
σn¯
. (4.4)
In order to check whether there exist other equilibria, we study the shape
of the two loci D1(n1, n2) = 0 and D2(n1, n2) = 0 in the n1-n2 plane. First,
the locus Di(n1, n2) = 0 intersects the nj-axis with j 6= i at nj > 1 because
α < ymini . Likewise, Di(n1, n2) = 0 intersects the ni-axis at ni < 1 because
ymaxi < α. Thus, due to continuity, the two loci intersect at other points if
−∂D1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯)
/
∂D1
∂n2
(n¯, n¯) > −1
or
f(y¯)
[
∂y1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯)− ∂y1
∂n2
(n¯, n¯)
]
− 1 > 0 (4.5)
since ∂y1/∂n2 < 0. Note that, by symmetry, this condition implies that the
same holds for i = 2.
Let ηh be the elasticity of the externality function h evaluated at n = n¯:
ηh =
n¯h′(n¯)
h(n¯)
.
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Note that an increasing value of ηh means that the agglomeration externality,
evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium, becomes more reactive to a small
deviation in the mass of entrepreneurs.
Let ηF be the elasticity of the distribution function F evaluated at α = y¯:
ηF =
y¯f(y¯)
F (y¯)
.
Since f(y¯)y¯ = ηFF (y¯) and F (y¯) = n¯ by definition of n¯, it must be that
f(y¯)y¯/n¯ = ηF . Hence, the sufficient condition (4.5) implies the following
result.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the two countries are identical. Then, there
always exists a symmetric entrepreneurship equilibrium, whereas asymmetric
equilibria also exist if
ηh >
(1− φ)2 + (1 + φ)2/ηF
4φ
. (4.6)
Since the right hand side of (4.6) decreases from ∞ to 1/ηF as φ in-
creases from 0 to 1, for low degrees of trade openness the externality at the
symmetric equilibrium must be strong for the condition (4.6) to holds. Con-
sequently, once agglomeration economies are at work, trade liberalization is
likely to foster the emergence of asymmetric industrial structures between
trading partners that are otherwise identical.
It is readily verified that
∂y1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯) = y¯
2φn¯h′(n¯)− (1 + φ2)h(n¯)
(1 + φ)2n¯h(n¯)
=
2φ
(1 + φ)2
y¯
n¯
(
ηh − 1 + φ
2
2φ
)
(4.7)
and
∂y1
∂n2
(n¯, n¯) = −y¯2φ[n¯h
′(n¯) + h(n¯)]
(1 + φ)2n¯h(n¯)
= − 2φ
(1 + φ)2
y¯
n¯
(ηh + 1).
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As expected, an increase in the number of entrepreneurs n1 gives rise to two
opposite effects in country 1. The former stems from the agglomeration ex-
ternality that, everything else equal, fosters an increase in the entrepreneurs’
income by lowering the fixed cost they bear to launch a new variety. The lat-
ter is due to the more intense competition unleashed by the larger number of
locally produced varieties; as usual, it tends to lower y1. When there is au-
tarky, the agglomeration externality has no impact since y1(n1, n2) = µ/σn1
is independent of h(·). However, once the two economies are open to trade,
this externality may affect the industrial structure of both countries. Note
first that, when there are no externalities (h′(n) ≡ 0), the only force at work
is the market crowding effect so that
∂y1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯) < 0.
As seen in Section 3, the symmetric equilibrium is thus unique. The mar-
ket crowding effect still dominates when the intensity of the agglomeration
externality is weak. On the other hand, once the agglomeration external-
ity effect is sufficiently large, there also exist asymmetric entrepreneurship
equilibria, involving a larger number of entrepreneurs in one country than
in the other. Specifically, (4.7) shows that the net effect of increasing n1 is
positive for country 1 entrepreneurs when the agglomeration externality at
the symmetric equilibrium is sufficiently strong for
ηh > (1 + φ2)/2φ. (4.8)
to hold. This condition may be given a nice interpretation. For that, observe
that ∂y1/∂n1 can be decomposed as follows. Let yH1 be the first term in (4.1)
and yF1 the second term. Then, we have
∂yH1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯) =
φ
(1 + φ)2
y¯
n¯
(
ηh − 1
φ
)
and
∂yF1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯) =
φ
(1 + φ)2
y¯
n¯
(ηh − φ) .
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Both effects are positive when ηh exceeds 1/φ and φ. Condition (4.8) thus
holds if and only if ηh is larger than the arithmetic mean of 1/φ and φ. In
the limit when there is no trade cost, the condition boils down to ηh > 1.
Note, finally, that an increase in n2 has only a market crowding effect in
country 1 since the externality is localized. This implies that ∂y1/∂n2 is
always negative.
In what follows, we show that the heterogeneity of individuals has a
stabilizing effect in that heterogeneity tends to work in the opposite direction
from externality. To this end, we use the concepts of local and of global
heterogeneity.
4.2 Local heterogeneity and stability
To study the local stability of equilibria, we consider the myopic best re-
sponse dynamics given by
n˙1(t) = F [y1(n1(t), n2(t))]− n1(t)
n˙2(t) = F [y2(n1(t), n2(t))]− n2(t).
(4.9)
Observe that the set of entrepreneurship equilibria is identical to the set of
rest points of this dynamics. We identify a local condition on the distribution
of types for the symmetric equilibrium (n¯, n¯) to be stable with respect to
the dynamics (4.9).
We know from the foregoing that the symmetric equilibrium (n¯, n¯) is
stable if
−∂D1
∂n1
(n¯, n¯)
/
∂D1
∂n2
(n¯, n¯) < −1
or, equivalently, if
ηh <
(1− φ)2 + (1 + φ)2/ηF
4φ
. (4.10)
We borrow the concept of spread from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)
and restrict our attention to spread around the symmetric equilibrium y¯.
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Definition 4.1. A distribution F˜ is a spread of F around y¯ if F˜ (y¯) = F (y¯),
and F˜ (α) > F (α) for all α < y¯ and F˜ (α) < F (α) for all α > y¯.
When F˜ (with the density f˜) is a spread of F , it must be that
f˜(y¯) < f(y¯).
By continuity of the two densities, this inequality must hold in some neigh-
borhood (y¯−ε, y¯+ε) of y¯. In other words, spreading F around y¯ implies that
its density gets smaller in (y¯− ε, y¯+ ε). This in turn means that individuals
whose types are in the vicinity of y¯ are more dispersed under F˜ than under
F . Hence, by spreading the distribution of types around y¯, we can make the
population more heterogeneous around y¯. This is why we may refer to it as
local heterogeneity.
We are now equipped to show that a sufficient amount of heterogeneity
around y¯ leads to the stability of (n¯, n¯). Indeed, when f˜(y¯) tends to zero,
ηF˜ also tends to zero, so that the right hand side of (4.10) goes to infinity.
This implies that (n¯, n¯) is stable as long as f˜(y¯) is sufficiently small. Thus,
we have:
Proposition 4.2. If the distribution of types around y¯ is sufficiently het-
erogeneous, then the symmetric equilibrium (n¯, n¯) is locally stable.
Intuitively, this proposition may be understood as follows. When the
system (4.2) is perturbed around (n¯, n¯), individuals who are affected by
the resulting change in income are those whose types are close to y¯, whereas
individuals whose types are away from y¯ remain unaffected. At (n¯+ε, n¯−ε)
where ε > 0, some country-1 individuals have a higher income and some
country-2 individuals have a lower income than what they earn at (n¯, n¯).
The fraction of country-1 individuals affected by this income rise is given by
f˜(y¯)
(
∂y1
∂n1
ε− ∂y1
∂n2
ε
)
+ o(ε).
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If many individuals are concentrated around y¯, then f˜(y¯) is much greater
than ε. Thus, because of the externality function, the income of country-
1 potential entrepreneurs is further increased in an interval that includes
(n¯ + ε, n¯ − ε). This in turn sparks a further increase in n1, which moves
further away from n¯. On the contrary, if individuals are widely dispersed
around y¯, then f˜(y¯) is much lower than ε. In this case, the individuals
affected by the income rise are too few for the externality to amplify the
perturbation. As a result, n1 goes back towards n¯, which is stable. A
similar argument applies to n2.
4.3 Global heterogeneity and uniqueness
To capture the idea of global heterogeneity, we borrow the parameterization
proposed by Herrendorf et al. (2000). Given F , let n¯ ∈ (0, 1) and y¯ ∈ (α, α)
be as in (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. Then, define F (·|γ, y¯) as
F (α|γ, y¯) = F (γα+ (1− γ)y¯)
where γ ∈ (0,∞). Note that
f(α|γ, y¯) = γf(γα+ (1− γ)y¯)
is the density of F (α|γ, y¯) on the support[
α− 1− γ
γ
(y¯ − α), α+ 1− γ
γ
(α− y¯)
]
. (4.11)
Thus, a lower value of γ implies a more heterogeneous population of individ-
uals. Indeed, as γ decreases, the whole density of types gets more spread over
a broader domain. By taking such a transformation of F , the population of
individuals exhibits a wider array of types while, for all types, less individ-
uals share the same one. Observe, however, that F (y¯|γ, y¯) = F (y¯) so that
the value of F (α|γ, y¯) at y¯ is the same as the value of the initial distribution
there. Consequently, (n¯, n¯) remains the unique symmetric equilibrium of
32
the economy when types are distributed according to the γ-transformation
of F .
Note also that ηF (·|γ,y¯) = γηF (·), whereas the system (4.2) must be re-
placed by
Di(n1, n2|γ, y¯) = F (yi(n1, n2)|γ, y¯)− ni
so that (n¯, n¯) is the intersection point of the two loci D1(n1, n2|γ, y¯) = 0
and D2(n1, n2|γ, y¯) = 0.
We have the following.
Proposition 4.3. There exists γ¯ > 0 such that the symmetric equilibrium
(n¯, n¯) is unique and globally stable when γ < γ¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Thus, despite the presence of an agglomeration externality, when indi-
viduals display enough contrasted attitudes toward entrepreneurship, the
symmetric outcome is the only equilibrium.
We provide a numerical example to illustrate Propositions 4.2 and 4.3.
Consider a uniform distribution of types over (4.11) with y0 = y1(0, 1) =
y2(1, 0), α = y0, and α = 2y¯− y0, where y¯ is given by (4.4). The externality
function is such that
h(ni) = 1 +An
β
i .
The parameter values are as follows: m1 = m2 = 1, β = 3.3, A = 100, σ = 3,
φ = 0.17, and µ = 10. Under these parameters, the symmetric equilibrium
is given by (n¯, n¯) = (0.5, 0.5).
Figures 2(a) to 2(c) describe the changes in the correspondence of equi-
libria associated with γ decreasing from 1 to 0.5. The equilibrium condi-
tion for country 1 is represented by the solid line, while the dashed line
describes this condition for country 2. In Figure 2(a) where γ = 1 and
[α, α] = [−1.95, 15.28], it is readily verified that the symmetric equilibrium
is unstable. In Figure 2(b) where γ = 0.75 and [α, α] = [−1.95, 15.28],
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Figure 2: Heterogeneity and entrepreneurship
the symmetric equilibrium becomes stable although there exist two asym-
metric stable equilibria. In Figure 2(c), which is drawn for γ = 0.5 and
[α, α] = [−6.26, 19.60], the symmetric equilibrium is unique and globally
stable. Note that the lower bound of the support becomes negative when γ
is close to zero, thus violating our assumption that types are non-negative.
We have chosen to keep the example as is because it is extremely simple and
illustrative.
In many contemporary models of trade, industrial organization and de-
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velopment, externalities are used to show that strongly asymmetric equilib-
ria may arise. In this perspective, Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 are potentially
important because there is ample evidence that heterogeneity across indi-
viduals is pervasive, whether externality effects are present or not. We may,
therefore, expect heterogeneity across individuals to play an important role
in the determination of the industry structure and the effects of trade liberal-
ization. In the light of results discussed below, a result similar to Proposition
4.3 should hold even when countries are asymmetric. The behavior of the
resulting unique equilibrium would then be similar to the one described in
Section 3.
If individuals are identical, they all react in the same way, thus generating
bang-bang aggregate behavior. The most famous example is undoubtedly
given by the standard Bertrand model in which all consumers patronize the
cheapest firm. In this case, it is easy to figure out why, when an agglom-
eration externality is at work, a minor deviation from the symmetric equi-
librium gives rise to an unravelling process. By contrast, when individuals
are locally heterogeneous, their aggregate behavior around the symmetric
equilibrium is smoothed out. Furthermore, as individuals become globally
more heterogeneous, i.e., as γ decreases, the mass of individuals who choose
to become an entrepreneur, regardless of the decisions made by the others,
increases, and so does the mass of those who choose to be workers. In such
a context, the sluggish behavior of individuals is less and less driven by the
externality effect and, eventually, leads to the uniqueness, hence the global
stability, of the symmetric equilibrium. Herrendorf et al. (2000) have made
the same point in a model of occupational choice with infinitely lived agents
and a closed economy, while we study the impact of trade within a general
equilibrium model.9
9See also Dokumaci and Sandholm (2007), who make the same point in a version of
Schelling’s residential segregation model.
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This is reminiscent of existing results such as de Palma et al. (1985)
and Anderson et al. (1994) who prove that a sufficient amount of hetero-
geneity guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in location and voting
games. When individuals are heterogeneous, their sluggish aggregate be-
havior makes firms understand that they no longer gain a large share of
customers by moving close to their ideal points. Furthermore, more hetero-
geneity makes the symmetric equilibrium unique because this leads firms to
choose a location which yields the best average match between firms and
dispersed consumers. Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) also show how global het-
erogeneity across potential migrants damper the agglomeration process in
the core-periphery model, where the concentration of workers is driven by
a pecuniary externality. Like us, they prove that a sufficient amount of
heterogeneity across individuals sustains the symmetric pattern as the only
stable equilibrium. In the same spirit, McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) have
shown that any finite game has a unique equilibrium when there is enough
heterogeneity.10
5 Conclusion
The general press and anti-globalization groups often maintain that inter-
national economic integration leads to a more uniform and grey world. In
view of our results, they seem to be right since market integration leads to
the destruction of firms and varieties when the national economies become
involved in the first stages of trade liberalization. In particular, develop-
ing countries (here the country with the small market and industrial basis)
experience de-industrialization, an argument that lies behind the import-
10It should be emphasized that all these results are obtained under the assumption that
randomness is independent across agents. Indeed, as shown in the global game literature,
when agents are highly correlated, we need a small amount of heterogeneity to obtain
uniqueness (Morris and Shin, 2003, 2005; Ui, 2006).
36
substituting industrialization policies put forward in the 1960s (Hirschman,
1968). However, our results also suggest that a deeper economic integration
leads to more diversity through the creation of new firms. In particular,
the integration of developing countries to the world market might well be
beneficial to them, as illustrated by the East Asian Miracle. Small countries
then benefit from market integration by regaining market share in the man-
ufacturing sector. What makes the whole process politically non-trivial is
the fact that trading partners are unevenly affected as trade barriers gradu-
ally disappear. In the first phase, the share of developed countries (here the
country with the large market and industrial basis) in manufacturing grows
at the expense of that of developing countries, whereas the opposite holds
in the second phase.
Since our model bears some resemblance with economic geography, it
is worth pursuing the comparison sketched in the foregoing. Through the
creation of new firms, a country may develop a (much) bigger manufactur-
ing sector than its trading partners. When agglomeration externalities are
strong enough, one country might even accommodate a very large share of
this sector. This is reminiscent of the core-periphery model proposed by
Krugman (1991) with identical firms, in which agglomeration stems from
the spatial mobility of firms and workers. However, contrary to us, low
trade costs do not spark international convergence in Krugman’s model.
The bell-shaped curve of spatial development mentioned above is obtained
once crowding forces that make the large agglomeration less attractive are
added to the model. Therefore, unlike what Mundell (1957) thought, com-
modity trade and factor mobility are not necessarily good substitutes once
markets are imperfect.
It should be emphasized, however, that the possible emergence of trade-
driven international disparities needs qualification. Indeed, when potential
entrepreneurs show very different opportunity costs, heterogeneity across
37
individuals tends to reduce such disparities. The comparison made with
other models also suggests that agents’ heterogeneity could well be a general
force that would destroy equilibria characterized by extreme features, thus
pushing toward more balanced market outcomes. In a way, this is not a
totally new idea. Ever since Hotelling (1929), we know that heterogeneity
is often sufficient to get rid of knife-edge results obtained when economic
agents are homogeneous. Clearly, more work is called for.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our analysis confirms a well-established
result, namely income inequalities within countries vary with the degree of
trade openness. However, we have seen that they also vary with the size
of the trading partners, a fact that has been overlooked in the literature.
Growing inequalities may induce national governments to implement redis-
tributional policies. The decision of a country to do so should trigger inter-
national reactions because it affects the welfare level in the others through
the access of their residents to the array of varieties. Some preliminary
analysis suggests that, for some levels of trade costs, a simultaneous move
toward less inequality could be harmful to both countries. We leave this
important topic for future research.
Appendix
A.1 Marginal cost heterogeneity
We assume that individuals are homogeneous in labor endowment. If an
individual becomes a worker, then her equilibrium wage is still one. Each
individual in country i is identified by her type βi, which is drawn according
to the distribution function Fi with support [βi, βi], where 0 < βi < βi.
Unlike Melitz (2003) and others, we assume ex ante heterogeneity: the in-
dividual knows her type βi before making her occupational choice.
If a type-βi individual becomes an entrepreneur, producing q units of
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a variety requires β1/(σ−1)i q units of labor while the entry cost is given by
her opportunity cost equal to the labor wage 1 (our expression for marginal
costs will allow for a simpler exposition). Hence, firms are heterogeneous
and a smaller value of βi corresponds to a more efficient firm. The profit of
a country-i firm of βi-type is given by
pii[βi] =
(
pii − β
1
σ−1
i
)
qiimi +
(
pij − β
1
σ−1
i
)
τqijmj − wi[βi]
thus implying that its equilibrium mill prices are given by
p∗ii[βi] = p
∗
ij [βi] =
σ
σ − 1β
1
σ−1
i .
For a given number ni ∈ [0,mi] of entrepreneurs in country i, the cutoff
point is such that βi = F−1i (ni). The corresponding country-i’s aggregate
efficiency is given by
Ai(ni) :=
∫ F−1i (ni)
β
i
β−1 dFi(β) (A.1)
which is increasing in ni (see expression (7) in Melitz (2003)).
Given (n1, n2), the equilibrium price index in country i can be shown to
be equal to
Pi =
σ
σ − 1
(
Ai(ni) + φAj(nj)
)− 1
σ−1
where the (effective) number of firms in (2.2) is replaced by the (effective)
aggregate efficiency of each country because marginal costs are no longer
identical across firms.
It is then readily verified that the salary wi[βi](n1, n2) of a country-i
entrepreneur of type βi is now given by (compare with (2.3))
wi[βi](n1, n2) = Bi(n1, n2)β−1i
where
Bi(n1, n2) :=
1
σ
[
µmi
Ai(ni) + φAj(nj)
+ φ
µmj
Aj(nj) + φAi(ni)
]
.
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is independent of the entrepreneur’s type (see expression (4) of Baldwin and
Okubo (2006)). Function Bi is to be interpreted as the average productivity
in value. Formally, due to our definition of types, it plays the same role as
function wi in Subsection 2.2. Because wi is multiplicatively separable in Bi
and βi, the ratio of any two country-i entrepreneurs’ salaries only depends
on their productivity levels.
As in (2.4), the salary of an entrepreneur is given by the constant fraction
1/σ of her firm’s revenue, which implies∑
i=1,2
∫ F−1i (ni)
β
i
wi[βi](n1, n2) dFi(βi) =
µ
σ
(m1 +m2).
A.1.1 The entrepreneurship equilibrium
A type-βi individual chooses to become an entrepreneur if and only if
wi[βi](n1, n2) ≥ 1
or, equivalently,
βi ≤ Bi(n1, n2).
An entrepreneurship equilibrium is a pair (n∗1, n∗2) such that
n∗1 = F1[B1(n
∗
1, n
∗
2)] n
∗
2 = F2[B2(n
∗
1, n
∗
2)].
As in Subsection 2.3, such an equilibrium always exists. Again we have
∂Fi[Bi(ni, nj)]/∂nj < 0, meaning that entrepreneurship decisions remain
strategic substitutes between countries.
As in (2.6), the equilibrium always lie on the locus of E(n1, n2) = 0
which now becomes
E(n1, n2) = F−11 (n1)A1(n1) + F
−1
2 (n2)A2(n2)−
µ
σ
(m1 +m2)
since ∫ F−1i (ni)
β
i
wi[βi](n1, n2) dFi(βi) = Bi(n1, n2)Ai(ni).
The locus E(n1, n2) = 0 is downward sloping. Observe that ∂E/∂ni > 0.
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A.1.2 The impact of trade opening
Assume Fi = miG, and denote si = ni/mi. As in Section 3, the salary
function becomes
w¯i[βi](s1, s2;φ) = B¯i(s1, s2;φ)β−1i (A.2)
where
B¯i(s1, s2;φ) :=
1
σ
[
µmi
mia(si) + φmja(sj)
+ φ
µmj
mja(sj) + φmia(si)
]
, (A.3)
and
a(si) :=
∫ G−1(si)
β
β−1 dG(β).
is independent of i.
As in Subsection 3.1, we define
D¯i(s1, s2;φ) := G[B¯i(s1, s2;φ)]− si
so that (s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ)) is an entrepreneurship equilibrium for φ if and only if
D¯i(s∗1(φ), s∗2(φ);φ) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Finally, let s¯ be defined by
G
(
µ
σa(s¯)
)
= s¯.
Replacing throughout w¯i by B¯i, the argument that goes from Observa-
tion 3.1 to Observation 3.4 in Subsection 3.1 can be repeated. As a con-
sequence, the counterpart of Proposition 3.5 holds in the case of marginal
cost heterogeneity. The economic intuition of this result is the same as that
presented in Subsection 3.1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Lemma A.1. Assume that the density f is bounded. If γ → 0, then f(·|γ, y¯)
converges uniformly to zero on R.
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Proof. Let M > 0 be such that f(α) ≤ M for all α ∈ R, where f is
defined to be zero outside the support [α, α]. Then, we have
sup
α∈R
f(α|γ, y¯) = sup
α∈R
γf(γα+ (1− γ)y¯) ≤ γM → 0
as γ → 0. ‖
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Because of symmetry, it is sufficient for unique-
ness to show that there exists γ¯ > 0 such that for all γ ∈ (0, γ¯), the slope of
the D1-locus at (n1, n2) is smaller than −1 when (n1, n2) is an equilibrium
Note that (2.3) implies that under the assumption h(0) > 0, the equi-
librium income yi has a positive lower bound ymin > 0 and an upper bound
ymax, which are independent of the distribution (and hence, of γ). When
the interval (α, α) is wide enough to include [ymin, ymax], we have F (ymin) >
0. Any equilibrium thus belongs to the compact set [F (ymin), F (ymax)] ×
[F (ymin), F (ymax)]. Since ymin < y¯ < ymax, for any γ < 1 we have F (ymin) <
F (ymin|γ, y¯) and F (ymax|γ, y¯) < F (ymax).
Observe that ∂y1/∂n1 and ∂y1/∂n2 are continuous on
[F (ymin), F (ymax)]×[F (ymin), F (ymax)], and thus there are constantsK1 > 0
and K2 > 0 such that |(∂y1/∂n1)(n1, n2)| ≤ K1 and |(∂y1/∂n2)(n1, n2)| ≤
K2 for all (n1, n2) ∈ [F (ymin), F (ymax)] × [F (ymin), F (ymax)]. It follows
from Lemma A.1 that, for all ε > 0, there exists γ¯(ε) > 0 such that
|f(y1(n1, n2)|γ, y¯)| < ε/max{K1,K2} for all γ < γ¯(ε) and any equilibrium
(n1, n2). Since (∂y1/∂n1)(n1, n2) > 0 and (∂y1/∂n2)(n1, n2) < 0, this
implies that, for all ε > 0, if γ < γ¯(ε), then
−1 < ∂D1
∂n1
(n1, n2|γ, y¯) = f(y1(n1, n2)|γ, y¯) ∂y1
∂n1
(n1, n2)− 1
≤ K1f(y1(n1, n2)|γ, y¯)− 1 < −1 + ε
and
0 >
∂D1
∂n2
(n1, n2|γ, y¯) = f(y1(n1, n2)|γ, y¯) ∂y1
∂n2
(n1, n2)
≥ −K2f(y1(n1, n2)|γ, y¯) > −ε
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for all equilibria (n1, n2). Thus, setting γ¯ = γ¯(1/2), we have that if γ < γ¯,
then
∂D1
∂n1
(n1, n2|γ, y¯)
/
∂D1
∂n2
(n1, n2|γ, y¯) < −1
for all equilibria (n1, n2). This implies that the equilibrium is unique.
Since the two-dimensional competitive dynamical system (4.9) is known
to be formally equivalent to a cooperative dynamical system, this equilib-
rium is globally stable (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Section 3.4). ‖
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